The Lemke-Howson 
Introduction
Game theory is the formal study of conflict and cooperation. In computer science, game theory has attracted recent interest for economic aspects of the internet, such as electronic commerce, selfish routing in networks [29] , and algorithmic mechanism design [24] . In complexity theory, game-theoretic ideas are basic for proving lower bounds for randomized algorithms [39] and in the competitive analysis of online algorithms [2] .
A bimatrix game is a two-player game in strategic form, a basic model in non-cooperative game theory. The strategic form is specified by a finite set of "pure" strategies for each player, and a (for simplicity of input, integer) payoff for each player for each strategy profile (which is a tuple of strategies, one for each player). The game is played by each player independently and simultaneously choosing one strategy, whereupon the players receive their respective payoffs. A player is allowed to randomize according to a probability distribution on his pure strategy set, which defines a mixed strategy for that player. Players are then interested in maximizing their expected payoffs. A Nash equilibrium is a profile of (possibly mixed) strategies such that no player can gain by unilaterally choosing a different strategy, where the other strategies in the profile are kept fixed. Every game has at least one equilibrium in mixed strategies [23] . For two players, the game is specified by two m × n integer matrices A and B, where the m rows are the pure strategies i of player 1 and the n columns the pure strategies j of player 2, with resulting matrix entries a ij and b ij as payoffs to player 1 and 2, respectively. This is called a bimatrix game (A, B) .
A classic open problem is the complexity of the problem NASH of finding one Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game. For the special case of zero-sum games, which are bimatrix games (A, −A), this problem can be solved by linear programming, but in general is not known to be polynomial. Together with factoring, NASH has been called "the most important concrete open question on the boundary of P today" [27] . A standard method for finding one Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game is the Lemke-Howson (LH) algorithm [15] . In this paper, we present a class of games where this algorithm is exponential. The LH algorithm is a pivoting method related to the simplex algorithm for linear programming [5] , which also has worst-case exponential behavior [14] . Our games show that even the best-case behavior of the LH algorithm can be exponential, for any choice of its free parameter (the first variable "to enter the basis"). To our knowledge, these are the first examples of this kind. Finding a Nash equilibrium in subexponential time must therefore go beyond this classic pivoting approach.
The Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game are solutions to a linear complementarity problem (LCP) [4] . In [22] [10] , LCPs are constructed where for certain pivoting methods one path is exponentially long, in analogy to [14] . In our case, all LH paths are exponentially long. Moreover, the examples in [22] [10] do not arise from games.
Our games are hard to solve for the LH algorithm for any choice of its free parameter. Another approach to finding an equilibrium is to guess its support (the set of pure strategies that have positive probability), solve the linear equations that equalize the expected payoffs for the pure strategies in the support, and check that no other strategy has higher payoff (see Lemma 1 below). In the games presented here, the support of the unique equilibrium is the set of all strategies, which is easily guessed. However, our games are a first step towards "challenge instances" for the problem NASH. In [30] , the present construction is extended to d × 2d games. These games have many equilibria, where player 1 always uses all d rows, but where the supports for player 2 form an exponentially small fraction of all 2d d sets of columns of size d. In these games, support guessing takes exponential expected time. Moreover, all LH paths are exponentially long.
NASH belongs to the complexity class TFNP of total function problems in NP [26, p. 229] : With the bimatrix game as input, the required output are the mixed strategy probabilities (as the decision problem whether an equilibrium exists is trivial), where the equilibrium property is verified in polynomial time. The class TFNP does not have complete problems unless NP = co-NP [20] .
More specifically, NASH belongs to the subclass of TFNP call PPAD, of problems with a parity argument for directed graphs [25, p. 516] . The parity argument states that a directed graph (defined implicitly), where the indegree and outdegree of every node is at most one, consists of cycles and directed paths, so that there are as many starting points as endpoints of these paths. An instance of a problem in PPAD is specified by a polynomial-time algorithm for finding at least one starting point, and for finding the neighbor of a point in the graph or else declaring it as an endpoint. The possible endpoints (of which at least one exists) are the allowed function values. The LH algorithm is a special case. It uses a trivial artificial equilibrium as starting point, has a freely chosen starting edge as a parameter, and then uses a unique "complementary" pivoting rule for determining the next "basic solution". It thereby traces the vertices of a certain polytope and ends at an equilibrium. The edges of the graph are directed (so the direction of the path can be determined even without knowing the past history) by a geometric orientation [32] ; see also Figure 1 below. The parity argument may be inefficient if the paths are not of polynomial length. Our paper shows explicitly that this inefficiency may occur for NASH, by giving games that produce exponentially long LH paths.
A related question is if NASH may be complete for the class PPAD. This seems to require encoding an arbitrary polynomial-time Turing machine computation into complementary pivoting steps for polynomial-sized payoff matrices, which looks difficult.
Unlike the set of solutions to a linear program, or equivalently [5, p. 290 ] of equilibria of a zero-sum game, the set of Nash equilibria of a general bimatrix game is not convex. Thus, NASH cannot be approached in an obvious way by interior point methods. Moreover, the set of all Nash equilibria is computationally "hard" in the sense that various associated decision problems are NP-complete, e.g. if the game has only one Nash equilibrium, or one with a certain support size, or with a player's payoff above a given bound [8] [3] . Therefore, any method for finding one Nash equilibrium, e.g. by divide-and-conquer or incrementally (which is not obvious at any rate) must be weaker than characterizing the set of all equilibria in the end, if such a method is to be polynomial (unless P = NP).
Lemke's algorithm [16] is closely related to the LH algorithm. Its extra flexibility given by the choice of numerical values in an auxiliary vector, rather than just of finitely many starting edges as in the LH algorithm, deserves further study; see also [19] .
Equilibrium enumeration methods (see [36] [38] [11] [1] and the survey in [34] ) can be modified to terminate once the first equilibrium is found, and would have to be tested on our games as well. These methods are designed to produce all rather than just one equilibrium, which cannot even be polynomial in the output size (unless P = NP), since deciding if a game has only one Nash equilibrium is NP-complete ( [8] , see above). There is no a priori reason to assume that these methods are good for finding just one equilibrium. Similarly, general algorithms for finding equilibria in games with any number of players are not likely to be fast. These include path-following algorithms [7] , which typically specialize to pivoting in the two-player case (for a generalization of LH to more than two players see [28] [37]), and algorithms for approximating fixed points [18] [25] .
Finding an ε-approximate equilibrium (see e.g. [17] ) is a different problem than NASH. In our games, all points on the LH path fulfill the equilibrium condition except for one pure strategy, and it is possible that the payoff "error" for that strategy goes below ε after a small number of steps; we have not investigated this. Similarly, a pivoting method implemented in floating-point arithmetic may quickly and erroneously produce an "equilibrium" due to rounding errors. Numerical problems arise since our payoffs are derived from the moment curve, which leads to ill-conditioned matrices. These may possibly be avoided by using points on the trigonometric moment curve [40, p. 75f] [9, p. 67], as mentioned in Appendix A of [31] . Working implementations of the LH algorithm use exact integer arithmetic [35] .
Our work is most closely related to that of Morris [21] , who used dual cyclic polytopes to produce exponentially long paths, called "Lemke" paths in [21] , for a related method. As we will explain in Section 2, this can be interpreted as the LH method for finding a symmetric equilibrium of a symmetric bimatrix game. However, these games have additional non-symmetric equilibria that are found very quickly by the general LH algorithm, and are therefore not useful for our purpose. Morris showed that Lemke paths cannot be used to address the Hirsch conjecture [13] . This famous conjecture states a tight linear bound on the shortest path between any two vertices of a polytope, for which the best known bounds are not even polynomial [12] . A polynomial pivoting algorithm for NASH (or even for finding a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a symmetric game, using the symmetrization in (2) below), applied to zero-sum games, would answer that question as well.
Section 3 describes our construction. The LH paths are defined purely combinatorially in terms of the supports of, and best responses to, the mixed strategies that it traces. These correspond to known bit patterns that encode the vertices of dual cyclic polytopes, which are one of the few classes of polytopes whose face structure is known in arbitrary dimension. Linear recurrences for the various path lengths give rise to their exponential growth. The longest path lengths are given by every third Fibonacci number, growing with θ 3d/2 for a d × d game, where θ is the Golden Ratio. Shorter path lengths are obtained by certain sums of these, the shortest length being Ω(θ 3d/4 ). Proof details and examples of our LH paths are given in [31] .
Games, polytopes, and the Lemke-Howson algorithm
Given a bimatrix game (A, B) with m × n payoff matrices A and B, a mixed strategy for player 1 is a vector x in R m with nonnegative components that sum to one, and a mixed strategy for player 2 is a similar vector y in R n . All vectors are column vectors; the row vector corresponding to x is written as the transpose x . A best response to y is a mixed strategy x of player 1 that maximizes his expected payoff x Ay, and a best response to x is a mixed strategy y of player 2 that maximizes her expected payoff x By. A Nash equilibrium is a pair of mutual best responses, that is, a mixed strategy pair (x, y) so that x Ay ≥ x Ay and x By ≥ x By for all other mixed strategies x and y. Best responses are characterized by the following combinatorial condition, which we state only for a mixed strategy x of player 1.
Lemma 1 [23] Let x and y be mixed strategies of player 1 and 2, respectively. Then x is a best response to y if and only if all strategies in the support of x are pure best responses to y.
A game (A, B) is symmetric if A = B , so it does not change when the players change roles. The game of "chicken" with A = B = 2 2 4 1 is an example. Its equilibria, in terms of probability vectors, are the bottom left pure strategy pair (0, 1) , (1, 0) with payoffs 4, 2 to players 1, 2, the top right pure strategy pair (1, 0) , (0, 1) with payoffs 2, 4, and the mixed strategy pair (1/3, 2/3) , (1/3, 2/3) with payoffs 2, 2. The mixed strategy equilibrium is the only symmetric equilibrium. Its probabilities are uniquely determined by the condition that the pure strategies in the support of the opponent's strategy must both be best responses (by Lemma 1) and hence have equal expected payoff.
In a mixed equilibrium, the probabilities are uniquely given by the pair of supports if the corresponding submatrices have full rank; the support sizes are then equal. This holds if the game is nondegenerate, defined by the property that the number of pure best reponses to any mixed strategy never exceeds the size of its support (see [34] for a detailed discussion). Even in a degenerate bimatrix game, any Nash equilibrium is a convex combination of extreme equilibria [38] [11] , which are also determined by linear equalities. The LH algorithm can be extended to degenerate games by standard lexicographic perturbation techniques [15] [34] . All games considered here are nondegenerate.
By Lemma 1, an equilibrium is given if any pure strategy of a player is either a best response (to the opponent) or is played with probability zero (by the player himself). This can be captured by polytopes [40] [9] whose facets represent pure strategies, either as best responses or having probability zero. We explain first the simpler case of symmetric equilibria of a symmetric game with d × d pay-off matrix C to player 1, say. Let
where 0 and 1 denote vectors with all entries 0 and 1, respectively, and inequalities holding for all components. We can assume that C is nonnegative and has no zero column by adding a constant to all payoffs, which does not change the best response structure, so that the polyhedron S is bounded and thus a polytope. We assume there are no redundant inequalities in Cz ≤ 1, which would correspond to dominated strategies [34] . Then the game is nondegenerate if and only if the polytope S is simple, that is, every vertex lies on exactly d facets of the polytope [40] [9] . A facet is obtained by making one of the inequalities defining the polytope binding, that is, by converting it into an equality.
Lemma 2 [36]
A mixed strategy pair (x, y) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the game (C, C ) if and only if
and z (1 − Cz) = 0, where z must be a vertex of S by nondegeneracy.
In the game of chicken above, z = (1/6, 1/3) gives the symmetric equilibrium. The vector z has to be rescaled to become a mixed strategy x. The equilibrium payoff u, normalized to 1 in Cz ≤ 1, is the scaling factor. The converse mapping from x to z defines a projective transformation of a polyhedron representing the upper envelope of expected payoffs to the polytope S [34] .
The conditions in Lemma 2 define an LCP [4] , usually stated as: find z so that
here with data M = −C, q = 1. This LCP has a trivial solution z = 0, which is not a Nash equilibrium. However, z = 0 is an artificial equilibrium which is the starting point of the LH algorithm (in our first version for symmetric games, giving what [21] calls "Lemke paths").
It is useful to label the facets of S [32] . For each pure strategy i, the facets defined by z i = 0 and by (Cz) i = 1 both get label i. Every vertex has the label of the facets it lies on. The complementarity condition z (1 − Cz) = 0 then means that z is completely labeled (has all labels i), since then each i is either not played or a best response, as required in equilibrium. Since S is simple, such a completely labeled vertex has each label exactly once.
The LH algorithm is started from the completely labeled vertex z = 0 by choosing one label k that is dropped, meaning that label k is no longer required. This is the only free choice of the algorithm, which from then on proceeds in a unique manner. By leaving the facet with label k, a unique edge is traversed whose endpoint is another vertex, which lies on a new facet. The label, say j, of that facet is said to be picked up. If this is the missing label k, the algorithm terminates at a completely labeled vertex. Otherwise, j is clearly duplicate, and the next edge is (uniquely) chosen by leaving the facet that so far had label j, and the process repeated. The LH method generates a sequence of k-almost complementary edges and vertices (having all labels except possibly k, where k occurs only at the starting point and endpoint). The resulting path cannot repeat a vertex as this would offer a second way to proceed when that vertex is first encountered, which is not the case (since S is simple). Hence, it terminates at a Nash equilibrium. 
Figure 1
This is illustrated in Figure 1 for dimension 3. Point a is completely labeled, being adjacent to facets with labels 1, 2, 3. Dropping label 1, it proceeds to point b picking up label 2, now duplicate. The next point is c with duplicate label 3, and finally d where the missing label 1 is picked up, which terminates the path.
As in the simplex algorithm [5] , edge traversal is implemented algebraically by pivoting with variables entering and leaving a basis, the nonbasic variables representing the facets. The only difference is the rule for choosing the next entering variable, which in linear programming is done so as to improve the objective function. Here, it is the complementary pivoting rule where the nonbasic variable with duplicate label enters the basis.
Furthermore, the path is directed, giving a "directed parity argument" [25] which puts the problem in the class PPAD, rather than just in PPA. In Figure 1 , the starting point a has an orientation, with the labels 1, 2, 3 in clockwise order. When label 1 is dropped, the remaining labels keep their orientation (in one dimension less) relative to the edges of the path. In Figure 1 , label 2 is always to the left and label 3 always to the right of the edge. At the endpoint of the path, the missing label is picked up at the other end of the edge, so that the orientation of that vertex is opposite to that of the starting vertex of the path; in Figure 1 , point d has labels 1, 2, 3 in anticlockwise order. This generalizes to higher dimensions, where orientation is defined as the sign of a certain determinant. The endpoints of any LH path have opposite orientation, which leads to an index theory of equilibria [32] [7] . Knowing the orientation of the artificial equilibrium, the orientation of any k-almost complementary edge can be determined directly, which gives the PPAD property.
For nonsymmetric bimatrix games (A, B) , or even for finding nonsymmetric equilibria of symmetric games as in the game of "chicken" above, the LH algorithm is applied as follows, which is its standard form. Let
The polytope S of dimension d = m + n in (1) is then the product P × Q of the polytopes
Any Nash equilibrium (x, y) of (A, B) is again given by z (1 − Cz) = 0, which is equivalent to x (1 − Ay) = 0 and y (1 − B x) = 0. These conditions state that x is a best response to y and vice versa, where x and y have to be normalized to represent mixed strategies. The only difference to Lemma 2 is that this normalization has to be done separately for x and y, rather than for the entire vector z. It is easy to see that in equilibrium x = 0 if and only if y = 0, where (0, 0) is the artificial equilibrium. The LH algorithm is then applied as before, where a label corresponds either to a strategy i of player 1 or a strategy j of player 2. These have to be distinct, so it is convenient to number the n strategies of player 2 as m + 1, . . . , m+n, as suggested in [32] . A duplicate label then represents a pure strategy that has both probability zero and is a best response. If this is a strategy i of player 1, for example, it determines the facet x i = 0 in P or (Ay) i = 1 in Q, corresponding to the respective ith inequality in (3).
The LH path on the edges of S = P × Q is a subgraph of the product graph of the edge graphs of P and Q. This means that edges are alternately traversed in P and Q, keeping the vertex in the other polytope fixed. A duplicate label picked up in Q is dropped in P and vice versa. This is the standard view of the LH algorithm; for further details see [34] .
Lemke-Howson on labeled dual cyclic polytopes
We construct square games with m = n = d strategies for each player. Similar to [33] , these are derived from dual cyclic polytopes [40] [9] in dimension d with 2d facets. A standard way of obtaining a cyclic polytope P in dimension d with 2d vertices is to take the convex hull of 2d points µ(t i ) on the moment curve µ : t → (t, t 2 , . . . , t d )
for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2d. However, the polytopes in (3) are defined by inequalities and not as convex hulls of points. In the dual of a polytope, its vertices are re-interpreted as normal vectors of facets. The polytope P is first translated so that it has the origin 0 in its interior, for example by subtracting the arithmetic mean µ of the points µ(t i ) from each such point. The resulting vectors c i = µ(t i ) − µ then define the dual cyclic polytope
A vertex u of such a polytope is characterized by a bitstring u 1 u 2 · · · u 2d of length 2d, with the kth bit u k indicating whether u is on the kth facet (u k = 1) or not (u k = 0). The polytope is simple, so exactly d bits are 1, the other d bits are 0. Assume that t 1 < t 2 < · · · < t 2d when defining the kth facet of P by making the inequality (µ(t k ) − µ) z ≤ 1 binding. Then the vertices of P are characterized by the 0-1 strings fulfilling the Gale evenness condition [6] : A bitstring represents a vertex if and only if any substring of the form 01 · · · 10 has even length, so 0110, 011110, etc., is allowed, but not 010, 01110, and so on. A maximal substring of 1's is called a run. We only consider even dimension d, where the allowed odd runs of 1's at both ends of the string can be glued together to form an even run, which shows the cyclic symmetry of the Gale evenness condition. Let G(d) be the set of these Gale evenness bitstrings of length 2d with d ones. Both P and Q in (3) will be dual cyclic polytopes with a special order of their inequalities corresponding to the facet labels. A suitable affine transformation [33, p. 560] gives P from P , and Q in a similar manner, so that the first d inequalities (for the pure strategies of player 1) in P have the form x ≥ 0, and the second d inequalities (for the pure strategies of player 2) in Q are y ≥ 0. The remaining d inequalities B x ≤ 1 in P and Ay ≤ 1 in Q then determine the game (A, B) . The game data is of polynomial size in d.
The equilibrium condition and the LH algorithm depend on which facets a vertex belongs to, as encoded in the Gale evenness bitstrings in G(d), and on the facet labels. These are defined by permutations l and l of 1, . . . , 2d for P and Q, respectively. For a vertex u of P, which we identify with its bitstring in G(d), its labels are given by l(k) where u k = 1, and the labels of a vertex v of Q are l (k) where v k = 1, for 1 ≤ k ≤ 2d. The kth facet of P (corresponding to the kth position in a bitstring) has label l(k) = k, so l is simply the identity permutation. The kth facet of Q has label l (k). The permutation l has the fixed points l (1) = 1 and l (d) = d, and otherwise exchanges adjacent numbers, as follows:
The artificial equilibrium e 0 is a vertex pair (u, v) so that u is labeled with 1, . . . 
A similar Nash equilibrium e 1 is readily identified, which has full support.
Lemma 3 Let e
. This is the only Nash equilibrium of the game.
Proof. Let (u, v) be a completely labeled vertex pair, and Hence, all LH paths, for any dropped label, lead from e 0 to e 1 . Denote by π(d, k) the path when label k is dropped in dimension d, regarded as a sequence 
Figure 3
As an example, Figure 2 shows π (4, 8), with P on the left and Q on the right. The numbers at the top are the labels l(k) and l (k) for k = 1, . . . , 8. The starting point e 0 is the vertex pair e 0 = (u 0 , v 0 ) = (11110000, 00001111).
We first drop label 8 in Q, so the bit v 0 7 (since l (7) = 8) changes from 1 to 0, which by Gale evenness gives the bit string 10001101 as the new vertex v 1 in Q. In Figure 2 , u 0 is connected to both v 0 and v 1 by a sloped line, since u 0 = u 1 . These sloped lines (forming the middle zigzag path) indicate the vertex pairs on the LH path, which we use since in each step only one vertex changes but the other stays fixed. In v 1 , label 1 has been picked up, which is now duplicate and dropped from u 1 in P, giving the next vertex u 2 = 01111000. The new duplicate label is 5 and in the next step dropped in Q, giving vertex 10011001. In that manner, the path proceeds until it ends at e 1 . We will show that all paths can be expressed in terms of the two special paths π(d, 1) and π(d, 2d). These have certain symmetries.
Lemma 4 Let
Proof. The particular names of the labels do not matter, so we can re-name them for both P and Q with the permutation l in (4), the kth facet in P getting label l (l(k)), which is l (k), and in Q label l (l (k)), which is l(k).
But then P and Q switch roles, e 0 is exchanged with e 1 , label 1 stays the same, and the path backwards corresponds to π(d, 1) itself as claimed.
For the path π(d, 2d), we disregard the first vertex pair and the last two vertex pairs. The remaining path, which will call B(d), is point-symmetric in each polytope, by reversing the bitstrings while ignoring the zero bit for the missing label. Figure 3 shows this for d = 4 where the disregarded rows and columns are struck out.
Lemma 5 Let
In (u 1 , v 1 ), the duplicate label is 1, which is then dropped in P, and never picked up again.
Proof. An example for the following arguments is provided by Figure 2 . Equation (9) holds because the label 2d is missing for all i = 1, . . . , L − 2. After one step on π(d, 2d), the vertex pair
is reached. The duplicate label is 1, which has been picked up in Q, and will next be dropped in P from u 1 . The
. This is reached by picking up label 2d in P. The previous vertex pair is therefore
is therefore
with duplicate label 2d − 1. This vertex pair is reached
This describes the starting vertex pair (u 1 , v 1 ) and ending
Equations (6), (7), and (8) are then shown by induction; for details see [31] . Proof. The first edge of π(d, 1) joining e 0 to (01
does not wrap around, and neither does the last edge joining (0
In all other edges, position 1 is zero in both polytopes, so none of these edges wraps around either.
For any two paths π and π on G(n)×G(n), we denote by π+π the path obtained by joining with an edge the last vertex pair of π to the first pair of π , assuming this edge exists. The length of the new path is the sum of the lengths of π and π plus one; the number of its vertex pairs is simply the respective sum.
The following central theorem describes how paths π(d, 1) and π(d, 2d) are composed of other such paths, possibly from lower dimension.
Theorem 7 Consider
Then there are paths C(d) and mappings α, β, β , γ, γ defined on vertex pairs, and extended to sequences of vertex pairs, so that
Proof. Overview: The path C(d) is simply a tail segment of A(d). The mappings are given as follows: β and β are defined on
and β is determined by β due to Lemma 4. Furthermore, α, γ, γ :
defined as the bitstring u reversed,
With c = 2d − 4,
We obtain γ from γ by Lemma 5. First we show, equivalent to (12) and (13), that
Note that only positions 1 and 2d − 1 in Q (corresponding to the missing label in A(d) and B(d), respectively) are changed by the mapping β, and these positions are constant throughout B(d) by (7) and (9). The starting point
is given by (10) , and in the first step of B(d) label 1 is dropped in P. The path A(d) is also started by dropping label 1 in P from e 
The duplicate label is 2d − 1, which has been picked up in P. So in the next step of A(d), label 2d − 1 is dropped in Q and label 2d − 3 is picked up, giving the vertex pair We are now at the start of C(d) and want to show that this path segment starts with α(A(d − 2)) with α in (15) . Indeed, the starting vertex pair of
). The duplicate label is 2d − 3, which is to be dropped in P in the next step. The subsequent steps are represented by α(A(d−2)) since in the lower-dimensional polytope, label 1 is dropped, which is mapped by α to label 2d − 3 of the higher-dimensional polytope, considering α also as an injective map of labels, obtained in the obvious way from (15), namely α(k) = 2d − 2 − k for 1 ≤ k ≤ 2d − 4. Essentially, the subsequent steps in A(d − 2) map into higher dimension by (15) and by Lemma 6; we only need to check complementarity of the constant positions in higher dimension. In the higher dimension, position 1 with the missing label 1 is zero in both polytopes, consistent with (15) . Positions 2d − 1 and 2d are also complementary by (15) . For positions 2d − 3 and 2d − 2, we have complementarity because 2d − 3 is zero as it is obtained from the position with the missing label 1 in lower dimension. This shows that the initial segment of
In the last step of A(d − 2), label 1 is picked up in Q. So in the last step of α(A(d − 2)), label 2d − 2 is picked up in Q. Then we are at the vertex pair (v * , u
We have shown that the initial part of A(d) in (17) by dropping label 2d − 2 in P, is
which agrees with Lemma 4 and (18) . Thus, the remainder is the path β(B(d)) backwards but with the bitstrings for P and Q exchanged. However, using the symmetry of B(d) in Lemma 5, this part of the path can be expressed as β (B(d)) with a suitably defined mapping β , similar to β, which exchanges the bitstrings for P and Q. This shows (17) . We now show (14) . −2) ) because of Lemma 6 and since complementarity holds for the constant positions in higher dimension, which is easily checked using (16) . Next, by (17) ,
Now consider the starting point (u , v ) of β (B(d − 2)), which is (u , v ) given by (20) 
This shows that these two vertex pairs γ(u , v ) and γ(e Let a n be the number of vertex pairs of A(2n), which is one more than the length L(2n, 1) of that path. Let b n and c n be that number for B(2n) and C(2n), respectively. That is, for n ≥ 1, a n = L(2n, 1) + 1, b n = L(2n, 4n) − 2 . (21) Then the concatenation of paths in (12) implies a n = b n + c n , in (13) c n = a n−1 + b n , and in (14) b n = a n−1 + c n−1 . Moreover, the paths π(2, 1) and π(2, 4) have length 4 = a 1 − 
for n ≥ 1, that is,
So both the lengths of π(d, 1) and of π(d, 2d) for even d = 2n = 2, 4, 6, . . . are given by every third Fibonacci number (minus one and plus two, respectively). These are the longest paths. They occur several times, since
). This is due to the symmetry of the Gale evenness condition and of the labelings. Other paths π(d, k) are given as sums of these paths in lower dimension. They are characterized, for all possible dropped labels k, in the following theorem.
Theorem 8
The LH path lengths for any dropped label are characterized by (21) , (22), (23) , and The Fibonacci numbers in (22) are given by the wellknown explicit expression f n = Kθ n + K θ n with θ, θ = 0.5±0.5 √ 5 and K, K = 0.5±0.3 √ 5, where θ = 1.618 . . . is the Golden Ratio. Then f n is Kθ n rounded to the nearest integer since K θ n is less than 0.5 and at any rate exponentially small. By Theorem 8(d), the sequence of shortest LH path lengths L(2n, 3n) for n = d/2 = 1, 2, 3, . . . is 4, 10, 16, 42, 68, 178, . . ., which is the sequence of Fibonacci numbers with every third number omitted, times two. These shortest lengths grow with the square root of the longest lengths, which is still exponential.
Corollary 9
There are d × d games, for even d, where each LH path has length Ω(θ 3d/4 ).
